The Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan: Structure, Process and Agency by Padder, Sajad
  
 
 
 
 
Heidelberg  Papers  
 
in  South Asian  
 
and Comparat ive  Pol i t ics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Composite Dialogue between India and 
Pakistan: Structure, Process and Agency 
 
 
by 
 
Sajad Padder 
 
 
Working Paper No. 65 
February 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South  Asia  Ins t i tu te  
 
Depar tment  o f  Pol i t ica l  Science  
 
 Heidelberg  Univers i ty  
 
 
 
HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND  
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
ISSN: 1617-5069 
 
About HPSACP 
This occasional paper series is run by the Department of Political Science of the 
South Asia Institute at the University of Heidelberg. The main objective of the series 
is to publicise ongoing research on South Asian politics in the form of research 
papers, made accessible to the international community, policy makers and the 
general public. HPSACP is published only on the Internet. The papers are available 
in the electronic pdf-format and are designed to be downloaded at no cost to the user. 
The series draws on the research projects being conducted at the South Asia Institute 
in Heidelberg, senior seminars by visiting scholars and the world-wide network of 
South Asia scholarship. The opinions expressed in the series are those of the authors, 
and do not represent the views of the University of Heidelberg or the Editorial Staff. 
 
Potential authors should consult the style sheet and list of already published papers at 
the end of this article before making a submission. 
 
 
Editor Subrata K. Mitra 
 
Deputy Editors Jivanta Schöttli 
 Siegfried O. Wolf 
 
Managing Editor Radu Carciumaru 
 
Editorial Assistants Dominik Frommherz 
 Kai Fabian Fürstenberg 
 
Editorial Advisory Board Mohammed Badrul Alam 
 Barnita Bagchi 
 Dan Banik 
 Harihar Bhattacharyya 
 Mike Enskat 
 Alexander Fischer 
 Karsten Frey 
 Partha S. Ghosh 
 Namrata Goswami 
 Hans Harder 
 Julia Hegewald 
 Stefan Klonner 
 Anja Kluge  
 Karl-Heinz Krämer 
 Apurba Kundu 
 Peter Lehr 
  Malte Pehl  
  Clemens Spiess  
  Christian Wagner 
 
Sajad Padder 
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  6 5 ,  F e b r u a r y  2 0 1 2                                                    1 
 
The Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan: 
Structure, Process and Agency 
 
Sajad Padder
1
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Kashmir conflict, confidence building measures, peace dialogue, Indian-
Pakistan relations 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
The roots of the Composite Dialogue Process date back to May 
1997, when at Male, the capital of Maldives, the then Indian Prime 
Minister Inder Kumar Gujral and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz 
Sharif mooted the idea of a structured dialogue or the Composite 
Dialogue Process (CDP). Based on a compromise approach, the 
peace process enabled the two countries to discuss all issues 
including Jammu and Kashmir, simultaneously. Since its inception, 
the dialogue process has gone through numerous highs and lows in 
bilateral relations. It has remained susceptible to unforeseen 
incidents which have derailed the process several times in the past. 
However, since April 2003 it has progressed steadily till the 
November 26, 2008 Mumbai terror attacks when the dialogue 
process was suspended for a long time. This paper dwells upon the 
history of the peace process since its inception in 1997 and 
examines the progress made in the eight baskets of issues namely, 
Peace and Security including confidence building measures(CBMs); 
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K); Siachen; Wullar Barrage/Tulbul 
Navigation Project; Sir Creek; Economic and Commercial 
Cooperation; Terrorism and Drug Trafficking; and, Promotion of 
Friendly Exchanges in various fields. The analysis of the peace 
process in this paper hinges on three key questions. First, has any 
positive change in the mindset of both sides came about over the 
years due to the peace process? Second, what were the main 
achievements of CDP? And third, what are the prospects of 
resolving the pending bilateral issues in future talks? 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A ‘peace process’, to be worth the name, implies the existence of a structure, 
continuity and some understanding, however vague, of the result it seeks to achieve. 
In the 63 years of their existence as independent states, India and Pakistan took 50 
years — half a century — to develop a process in 1997, and an unsteady one at that. 
Only since 2004 has the peace process become organised, acquired speed and 
continuity, and an agreement on the fundamentals has seemed within reach. The 
roots of India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue Process date back to May 1997, when at 
                                                        
1 Sajad Padder is a Doctoral Fellow in the Department of Political Science, University of 
Kashmir, Srinagar. The author can be contacted at: sajadpadder98@gmail.com  
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Male, the capital of Maldives, the then Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral 
and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif mooted the idea of a structured dialogue 
or the Composite Dialogue Process.2 Based on a compromise approach, the peace 
process enabled the two countries to discuss all issues including Jammu and 
Kashmir, simultaneously. It was a compromise in the sense that while India agreed 
to include Kashmir in the agenda for talks, Pakistan relented to include terrorism, the 
two major irritants in bilateral relations. This first attempt at composite dialogue 
collapsed under the impact of the Kargil war in 1999. Although the two rounds of 
talks in 1998 (16–18 October and 5–13 November) had not seemed particularly 
propitious, the Lahore summit that followed seemed to have produced a 
breakthrough. However, no negotiations were likely to be able to survive the 
subsequent war and recriminations. From that point, the possibilities of a Composite 
Dialogue seemed distant as the Nawaz Sharif’s government in Pakistan was 
overthrown by a military coup and the new leader, General Pervez Musharraf, 
condemned the Lahore summit for allowing India, in effect, to avoid addressing the 
violence in Kashmir. 
 
Following Kargil and the failed Agra summit, the prospects for negotiation got 
much worse due to the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. 
Many in India believed that Pakistan had been complicit in these actions. But that 
event, along with 9/11 in the United States, also restructured international politics on 
the subcontinent. Tensions between India and Pakistan rose throughout the spring 
and summer of 2002, as war between India and Pakistan seemed increasingly likely. 
Yet that tension began to diminish in October 2002 and within six months, the focus 
had returned to the Composite Dialogue. So in April 2003, India began what was 
described as a ‘step-by-step’ initiative towards Pakistan. In July 2003, diplomatic 
relations and direct transport links were re-established and in November a ceasefire 
was initiated. The Composite Dialogue Process was revived in June 2004 in 
pursuance of a decision taken during the visit of former Prime Minister of India, Shri 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Pakistan in January 2004. Since then, four rounds of serious 
discussions have taken place between India and Pakistan (till the November 26, 2008 
Mumbai terror attacks), on the eight issues in order to try and resolve these 
contentious issues to the satisfaction of both sides. The eight issues under discussion 
in the Composite Dialogue process are: (1) Peace and Security, including 
confidence-building measures (CBMs); (2) Jammu and Kashmir; (3) Siachen 
Glacier; (4) Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation project; (5) Sir Creek; (6) Economic 
and Commercial Cooperation; (7) Terrorism and Drug trafficking; and, (8) 
Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields. 
 
PEACE AND SECURITY, INCLUDING CONFIDENCE BUILDING 
MEASURES 
 
Some of the major CBMs reached within the framework of the Composite Dialogue 
process include: 
 
 Formal Ceasefire along the LoC (Line of Control), International Border 
and the Actual Ground Position Line – brought into effect at midnight of 
25 November 2003 and has remained in effect since; 
 Delhi-Lahore bus service was started in 1999, but was stopped in light of 
the Kargil conflict. It was resumed in 2003; 
                                                        
2Ashutosh Misra, “An audit of the India-Pakistan peace process”, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Routledge, UK, 2007, p. 506. 
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 The first bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad was started in 
2005;  
 Bus services from Lahore to Amritsar, Amritsar to Nankana Sahib and 
train links between Munabao in Rajasthan and Khokhrapar in Sindh were 
started in 2006; 
 The Samjhauta Express, which runs between Delhi and Lahore, resumed 
service in 2005, and despite the 2007 blasts, has continued to run since; 
 The first overland truck route between the two countries was opened at the 
Wagah border crossing in 2007; 
 Air links were increased from 12 to 28 flights weekly, triple-entry permit 
for cross-LoC travel introduced and the frequency of the Srinagar- 
Muzaffarabad bus service increased from fortnightly to weekly, in 2008; 
 Joint Economic Commissions and Joint Business Councils were reactivated 
in 2004; 
 Agreement on Advance Notification of Ballistic Missile Tests – brought 
into effect in 2005 and required both parties to inform the other 72 hours in 
advance before testing any ballistic missiles within a 40 km radius of the 
International Border and the Line of Control; 
 Establishment of a Communication Link between Pakistan Maritime 
Security Agency and Indian Coast Guard – brought into effect in 2005, 
primarily to facilitate early exchange of information regarding fishermen 
apprehended for straying into each other’s waters; 
 Humanitarian aid in terms of food, medicine and the like was extended by 
India and accepted by Pakistan, in the aftermath of the earthquake in 
Pakistan Administered Kashmir in 2005;3  
 A Joint Anti-Terrorism Institutional Mechanism to identify and implement 
counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations in both the countries was 
brought into effect in 2006; 
 An agreement facilitating regular contact between state-run think tanks, 
Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (New Delhi), and Institute of 
Strategic Studies (Islamabad) was brought into being in 2008. This 
agreement is meant to contribute to building channels of communication at 
the level of scholars; 
                                                        
3 The agreement to open five points on the Line of Control (LOC) in order to provide relief 
and medical assistance to quake victims was widely acclaimed in J&K as a genuine 
humanitarian gesture by the two countries. “It is a good step” said Hurriyat leader Mirwaiz 
Umar Farooq. Ms. Mehbooba Mufti, Chairperson of the then ruling People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) said such steps were imperative for taking the process of restoration of peace 
and reconciliation forward. “I am very happy that it is happening. It was very much needed,” 
she said adding “this is the beginning. We’ll have to go a long way before the dream of 
oneness, harmony and affinity is translated into reality.” On November 5, 2005 the 
Spokesperson Navtej Sarna (Govt. of India) told a media briefing that the necessary work to 
operationalise the five points was under way. He said that the crossing point at Chakan da 
Bagh (Poonch) would be operationalised on November 7, at Kaman (Uri) on November 9 
and Tithwal (Tangdhar) on November 10, 2005. He clarified that due to non-availability or 
damage to infrastructure at the above crossing points, crossing would be permitted on foot. 
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 The first meeting of a Joint Judicial Committee of judges belonging to both 
countries was conducted in 2008. This committee is meant to look into the 
welfare and release of prisoners jailed in both countries. More than 500 
prisoners have been released by both sides in repeated instances in 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009; 
 Foreign Ministers of both countries agreed to a series of Kashmir-specific 
CBMs to facilitate crossing the LoC in 2008. A new dimension was added 
to Indo-Pak trade relationship with the revival of cross- LoC trade in 
October 2008;  
 Both countries agreed to host festivals displaying each other’s movies in 
2006. The Pakistani Government allowed for the legal release of Indian 
films in Pakistan in 2008.4 
 
JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
 
Stephen P. Cohen argues that ‘Kashmir is the most important single conflict in the 
subcontinent, not just because its territory and its population are contested, but 
because larger issues of national identity and regional power balances are imbedded 
in it.’5 A cursory look at the events in the last decade would reveal that India, 
Pakistan and even Kashmiris have reached the Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) 
stage on Kashmir, and that there is no way other than reaching an understanding at 
the political level. It is clear, that none of the parties involved in the conflict—India, 
Pakistan, Kashmiris and militants, can alter the status quo through military means. 
The status quo, on the other hand is also not acceptable, as it is hurting all parties 
concerned.  India and Pakistan have failed to alter the status quo in Kashmir, 
irrespective of the different political and military strategies that they employed in 
recent years. Before the Islamabad Summit in January 2004, there have been more 
than thirty-five occasions, in which the Heads of State in India and Pakistan have 
met. Besides these meetings at the highest levels, there were at least twelve rounds 
of talks between 1989 and 1998 before the Lahore and Agra Summits. Neither the 
meetings at the Heads of State level nor at the Foreign Secretary level, could proceed 
further. All these attempts invariably broke down, due to the failure of both 
governments to reach an understanding on Kashmir. 
 
During the period from 2004-2007, General Musharraf put forward various 
proposals for resolving the Kashmir imbroglio. In November 2003 in an interview 
with the BBC Radio Urdu Service, Musharraf re-introduced his ‘four-step’ approach 
to Kashmir, one he had tentatively put across during the Agra talks which offered to 
eliminate all options unacceptable to India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir and 
then evolve a consensual solution. The ‘four-steps’ envisaged: 
 
i. Official talks commence. 
ii. Centrality of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is acknowledged. 
iii. Any proposal unacceptable to India, Pakistan or Kashmiris is taken off the 
table. 
iv. Best solution acceptable to India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris is taken.6 
                                                        
4 Samarjit Ghosh, “Two Decades of Indo-Pak CBMs: A Critique from India”, Institute of 
Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, Issue Brief 132, September 2009. 
5 Stephen P Cohen, Draft case study “The Compound Crisis of 2002” in South Asia Amid 
Crisis, The Brookings Institution, p. 31. 
6 The Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned it in its official brief in 2005. 
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It is believed that the Musharraf’s ‘four-step’ proposal was discussed amongst 
the officials of both countries during the course of Composite Dialogue Process. In 
September 24, 2004, General Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan 
Singh met in New York and signed a joint statement indicating that they would start 
looking into various options on Kashmir and take the peace process forward. On 
December 5, 2006, Musharraf further polished his ideas and put forward the ‘four 
point formula’: 
 
i. Softening of LoC for trade and free movement of people. 
ii. Self governance/ autonomy. 
iii. De-militarization from whole of Jammu and Kashmir. 
iv. Joint supervision/ management. 
 
While the official process of Composite Dialogue and Musharraf’s ‘thinking 
aloud’ in the media continued between 2003 and 2007, an unofficial back channel 
was activated to discuss issues in an informal and more nuanced manner. The two 
principal envoys were—for Pakistan, a college classmate of Musharraf named Tariq 
Aziz, and for India it was Satinder Lambah. Their exertions produced a framework 
solution that was cleared on the Indian side by the Cabinet Committee on security 
and on the Pakistani side by the Corps Commanders Conference, before domestic 
political difficulties triggered by his dismissal of the Chief Justice forced Musharraf 
to back off.7 
 
SIACHEN GLACIER 
 
The highest battlefield in the world, the Siachen Glacier, has witnessed conflict 
between India and Pakistan for over twenty years. It has so far resulted in hundreds 
of causalities caused mostly by adverse climatic conditions and harsh terrain rather 
than military skirmishes. The conflict is also putting an enormous financial burden 
on the national exchequer of both sides. Sliding down a valley in the Karakoram 
Range, the glacier is 76 kilometers long and varies in width between 2 to 8 
kilometers.8  It receives up to 6 to 7 meters of the annual total of 10 meters of snow 
in the winter months. Blizzards can reach speeds of up to 150 knots (nearly 300 
kilometers per hour). The temperature drops routinely to 40 degrees centigrade 
below zero, and even lower with the wind chill factor. For these reasons the Siachen 
Glacier has been called the “Third Pole.”9  The altitude of some Indian forward 
bases on the Saltoro Ridge range from Kumar (16,000 feet) and Bila Top (18,600 
feet) to Pahalwan (20,000 feet) and Indira Col (22,000 feet). Because of the steep 
gradient of the Saltoro Range, the area is also prone to avalanches. Only 3 percent of 
the Indian causalities have been caused by hostile firing and the remaining 97 
percent fall prey to the altitude, weather, and terrain.  That is why the former Indian 
diplomat Mani Shankar Aiyar states, “In the frozen wastes of Siachen, General 
‘Frost Bite’ kills hundreds of jawans in the never-ending battle which both armies 
                                                                                                                                               
See http:// www.mofa.gov.pk/Pages/Brief.htm. 
7 Varadarajan Siddharth, “Time to End the Impasse with Pakistan”, The Hindu, April 26, 
2010. 
8Ashutosh Misra, “An audit of the India-Pakistan peace process”, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, 
Vol. 61, No. 4, December 2007, p. 513. 
9 Samina Ahmad and Varun Sahni, “Freezing the Fighting: Military Disengagement on 
Siachen Glacier”, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Papers (Sandia National 
Laboratories, Albuquerque) 1998, p. 10. 
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wage against Nature”.10 Pakistani positions are comparatively at a lower altitude in 
the glacier area, ranging between 9,000-15,000 feet.  
 
Initially Siachen was considered to be completely inhospitable and not worth 
any conflict on the ground. The original cease fire line (CFL) agreed to by India and 
Pakistan in the July 1949 Karachi Agreement did not cover the area of ‘the glaciers’ 
because of the difficulties of delineating the line. Beyond the delineated grid, Point 
NJ 9842, near Chalunka, the Karachi Agreement spoke of the line passing ‘north to 
the glaciers’.11 When the ceasefire line was changed into a mutually accepted line of 
control (LoC) in October 1972, the newly delineated line ran from the Shyok River 
west of Thang (which is on the Indian side) to Point NJ 9842. The area north of it 
was left blank and open to encroachments. Indians and Pakistanis have tried to stake 
their territorial claims by interpreting the vague language contained in the 1949 and 
1972 agreements to prove their respective points. For Pakistan ‘thence northwards’ 
means from NJ 9842 up to Karakoram Pass.12  India, on the other hand draws a north 
westerly line from NJ 9842 along the watershed line of the Saltoro Range, a southern 
offshoot of the Karakoram Range.13  
 
Map 1. Siachen Glacier and the Surrounding Areas14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The genesis of the Siachen dispute was the April 1984 Indian military 
initiative in the vicinity of the Siachen Glacier. The operation, code-named 
Meghdoot, triggered armed clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces in the area 
and eventually led to the current phase of dispute.15 Continuous negotiations have 
been held to contain and resolve the conflict ever since the outbreak of hostilities. As 
early as 1984 and 1985, flag meetings were held with little success between Indian 
and Pakistani sector commanders. Since January 1986, several high-level talks have 
                                                        
10 Mani Shankar Aiyar, “India-Pakistan: Retrospect and Prospect”, Wilhelm Von 
Pochhammer Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, 12 January 2011. 
11 Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim, Amitabh Mattoo, Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian 
Policy, Har-Anand Publications, New Delhi, 2001, p. 200. 
12 Samina Ahmad and Varun Sahni, “Freezing the Fighting: Military Disengagement on 
Siachen Glacier”, p. 16.         
13 Ibid. 
14 Source: Viney Bhatnagar 
15 Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim, Amitabh Mattoo, Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian 
Policy, p. 201. 
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been held between Indian and Pakistani Defense and Foreign Secretaries as well as 
senior military personnel, reflecting their desire to reach a peaceful and negotiated 
settlement. At the fifth round of talks between Defense Secretaries in June 1989, an 
understanding was initially reached to resolve the dispute. According to the joint 
statement issued at the conclusion of talks, “there was agreement by both sides to 
work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on redeployment of forces to 
reduce the chances of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of 
future positions on the ground so as to conform with the Simla Agreement and to 
ensure durable peace in the Siachen area.”16 At the sixth round of the Defense 
Secretary talks in November 1992, with the assistance of military experts, an India-
Pakistan agreement was reportedly reached that envisaged (1) the mutual withdrawal 
of troops from key passes to new positions, and (2) the creation of a ‘zone of 
complete disengagement’ as a result of troop disengagement and redeployment. The 
delineation of this area of ‘peace and tranquillity’ would be “without prejudice” to 
the known position of either side. The agreement also reportedly included pledges by 
both states to refrain from reoccupying vacated positions.17 The two countries, 
however, not only failed to implement these tentative agreements, but one or the 
other side denied that any tangible agreement had been reached on either occasion.  
The difficulty in reaching or implementing any mutually agreeable proposal was due 
to a number of factors, ranging from domestic political constraints to differences 
over the determination of redeployment positions, the demarcation of the proposed 
demilitarized zone, and ensuring the inviolability of such a zone. 
 
The talks on Siachen resumed at the Defence Secretary level in 2004 which 
proved inconclusive, apart from agreeing to hold further talks on the dispute. While 
offering a treaty of “peace, friendship and security” to Pakistan in March 2006, 
Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh had hinted that issues like the dispute over the 
Siachen glacier region and the boundary dispute in Sir Creek could be resolved soon. 
The then Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Khurshid Ahmed Kasuri, has been claiming 
that discussions to demilitarize the Siachen conflict zone, as a prelude to a final 
agreement to extend the Line of Control (LoC) beyond map reference NJ 9842, have 
been proceeding slowly towards reaching an agreement. However, the Indian side 
has been reticent and Defence Minster A. K. Antony, who visited Siachen on 5 May 
2007, has gone so far as to say that there is no question of progress on 
demilitarization unless Pakistan authenticates the forward positions of Indian 
troops.18 
 
A resolution of the Siachen dispute could be a big step towards building trust 
and confidence between India and Pakistan. A resolution of the Siachen issue has 
also become a priority from the ecological point of view. The military presence on 
Siachen is affecting the water supply to the rivers originating from these glaciers. 
They also account for the accumulation of huge debris on it. All this is destroying 
the pristine ecological balance of these landforms. The development of Siachen as a 
‘Peace Park’ in fact, is a very important CBM in removing the mistrust in India-
Pakistan relations. 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 Samina Ahmad and Varun Sahni, “Freezing the Fighting: Military Disengagement on 
Siachen Glacier,” Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Papers (Sandia National 
Laboratories, Albuquerque) 1998, p. 21. 
17 Atul Aneja, “Siachen Accord Envisages a Thaw,” The Hindu, March 28, 1997. 
18 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Does Siachen have Major Strategic Significance?” Asian Tribune, May 
22, 2007. 
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WULLAR BARRAGE/ TULBUL NAVIGATION PROJECT 
 
India and Pakistan disagree even on the name of this dispute. India refers to it as 
Tulbul Navigation Project whereas Pakistan calls it the Wullar Barrage. The Tulbul 
Navigation/Wullar Barrage Project envisages the construction of 439 feet long and 
40 feet wide barrage by India in 1984 on the river Jhelum, at the mouth of Wullar 
Lake, near Sopore town in Kashmir. Pointing to the storage utility of the barrage, 
Pakistan argued that India had Violated Article I (II) of the Indus Water Treaty 
(IWT) which prohibits both parties from undertaking any “man-made obstruction” 
that may cause change in the volume of the daily flow of waters unless it is of an 
insignificant amount.19 The talks on the dispute within the framework of the 
Composite Dialogue process resumed at the secretary level between the Indian 
Ministry of Water and Power and the Pakistani Ministry of Water Resources on 29- 
 30 July 2004 in which the two sides looked at the issue in light of the provisions of 
the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. The talks were cordial but failed to yield any 
breakthrough. In 2005, the next round of talks between the two ministries looked 
into the dispute, laying down future courses of action but like the previous round, no 
tangible solution emerged. Delegations of the two countries also met in New Delhi 
on 30-31 August 2007 for discussions. The Indian delegation was led by Mrs. Gauri 
Chatterji, Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India and the 
Pakistan delegation was led by Mr. Muhammad Ismail Qureshi, Secretary, Ministry 
of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan. The talks were held in a cordial and 
constructive atmosphere. The two sides further discussed their respective positions 
on the project and had a better appreciation of each other's views. The dispute can be 
easily resolved provided it is de-linked from the larger issue of Jammu and Kashmir, 
as was done when the Indus Water Treaty was signed in 1960. 
 
SIR CREEK 
 
The India-Pakistan dispute over Sir Creek can be traced back to the pre-
independence period, to around 1908, when an argument ensued between the rulers 
of Kutch and Sindh over a pile of firewood lying on the banks of a creek dividing the 
two principalities. The dispute was taken up by the government of Bombay state, 
gave its verdict in 1914, supported by Map Number B44 and subsequently B74.20 
Nothing significant happened in the next 40-50 years, and the dispute again came 
alive only in the 1960s. Sir Creek, which is more like a fluctuating tidal channel, is a 
sixty-mile-long estuary in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch. The Rann lies on the 
border between the Indian state of Gujarat and the Pakistani province of Sindh.  
 
In 1965, after armed clashes, Pakistan asserted that half of the Rann along 
24th parallel21 was Pakistani territory. India countered that the boundary ran roughly 
along the northern edge of the Rann. The matter was referred to arbitration and the 
Indo-Pakistani Western Boundary Case Tribunal’s Award on February 19, 1968, 
upheld 90 percent of India’s claim to the entire Rann, conceding small sectors to 
Pakistan.22 This still left the boundary of the Sir Creek from its head in the marshy 
lands of the Rann to its mouth in the Arabian Sea and the maritime boundary 
between India and Pakistan un-demarcated. India and Pakistan had agreed not to 
                                                        
19 Mallika Joseph, “Delhi Round of Indo-Pak Talks – II: Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar 
Barrage”, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), November 21, 1998. 
20 Ashutosh Misra, “The Sir Creek Boundary Dispute: A Victim of India-Pakistan Linkage 
Politics”, International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU), Boundary and Security Bulletin, 
UK, Winter 2000-2001, p. 91. 
21 The boundary line which Pakistan acknowledges and India refuses to acknowledge.  
22 Ibid. 
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refer this part of the un-demarcated boundary for adjudication to the tribunal. 
Because of this understanding between the parties, the tribunal had noted that it had 
not taken into consideration the boundary along the Sir Creek. The dispute has 
festered since then. As a result, it is not possible for India and Pakistan to distinguish 
between their territorial waters (the zone up to 12 nautical miles, where states enjoy 
exclusive rights and can restrict passage of foreign boats), their contiguous zones (up 
to 24 nautical miles, where states can enforce custom and fiscal laws, fisheries laws 
and ban acts prejudicial to the state) or their Exclusive Economic Zones (up to 200 
nautical miles extendable to 350 nautical miles for countries with continental shelf).  
 
Pakistan's contention is that the boundary along the Sir Creek must lie along 
the eastern edge of the creek. India believes that the boundary should be along the 
middle of the creek; that it should be demarcated using the 'thalweg' or the mid-
channel principle ('thal'- valley, 'weg' - way). The 'thalweg' principle lays down that 
boundaries along a river or a valley must lie along the line connecting the deepest 
points along a river channel or the lowest points along the valley floor. The case for 
a mid-channel boundary is based on the Sir Creek being a navigable channel 
throughout the year. Pakistan's contention is that the creek is not navigable and, 
therefore, the mid-channel principle does not apply. Today, the Sir Creek does not 
flow as shown in the 1914 map. It has shifted westwards i.e., towards Pakistan. 
However, the head of the creek, as it existed then, is marked by a boundary pillar, 
called Western Terminal. It was from this point that some 38 pillars marked the 
horizontal boundary eastwards. Pakistan neither recognises the existence of the 
Western Terminal nor the pillar-based horizontal boundary eastwards.23 Pakistan's 
contention is that the eastward boundary should be based on the dotted line as drawn 
in the 1914 map. This line is below the boundary marked by the pillars. The 
contentious question is: What should be recognised – the pillars on the ground or the 
line on the 1914 map? In the current climate, neither country is willing to concede 
territory. 
Map 2. Sir Creek Dispute24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In recent years, both sides have shown seriousness in settling the matter in an 
amicable manner. In 2005, a joint survey was launched in the marshy strip by both 
                                                        
23 Bharat Bhushan, “Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachen: Competitive Methodologies”, South 
Asian Journal, 2005.   
24 Source: Viney Bhatnagar 
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countries to ascertain their respective claims.25 The survey covered the horizontal 
section of the creek. The second month long survey took place in January 2007 in 
which hydrographers along with the ships of the two navies participated. The two 
surveys covered the land as well as the coast, to verify the outermost points of the 
coastlines in the disputed area, on the principle of equidistance.26 Both the sides 
disagree on how to proceed forward in delineating the border. After the completion 
of the joint survey, officials on both sides had noted that there has been a 
convergence to a great degree among both the countries on the delineation of the 
boundary. 
 
On the other hand, the United Nations (UN) is keeping mum on the protracted 
dispute between India and Pakistan over the ownership of Sir Creek even after the 
expiry of the deadline on May 2009 that was set by the world body to resolve this 
issue. The UN had set the deadline for the archrival countries to resolve this dispute 
amicably with a warning that after the expiry of the deadline the disputed area of sea 
would convert into international waters. The UN fixed this deadline in 1982, but 
after a lapse of 26 years, India and Pakistan have failed to settle this issue as a result 
of which the fishermen of both the countries are in serious trouble as they are 
detained frequently, put into jails and their boats are impounded, as they are deemed 
to be in violation of UN laws.27   
 
ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL COOPERATION 
 
India and Pakistan are the two largest economies in South Asia. Together, they 
account for 90 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 85 percent of the 
population of the region. They share a long contiguous border, have similar cultures 
and in a not-too-distant a past, enjoyed well-integrated transport and market links. If 
we look at neighbouring countries which are similar in size to India and Pakistan in 
terms of population or current GDP, such as Malaysia and China or Brazil and 
Argentina, bilateral trade accounts for 2.2 percent and 10.2 percent, respectively, of 
world trade in these countries. The case of India and Pakistan is quite different. At 
the time of partition, India and Pakistan were highly dependent on each other for 
trade. Thereafter, both resorted to deliberate measures to minimize their trade 
dependence on each other. India’s share in Pakistan’s global exports and imports was 
23.6 per cent and 50.6 percent respectively in 1948- 49. These shares went down to 
1.3 percent and 0.06 per cent in 1975-76 and 1.1 percent and 2.7 percent respectively 
in 2005- 06.28 Similarly, Pakistan’s share in India’s global exports and imports was 
2.2 percent and 1.1 percent respectively in 1951-52. These shares went down to 0.02 
percent and 0.4 percent in 1975-76, and 0.7 per cent and 0.13 per cent in 2005- 06.29 
This shows that the trade between these two neighbouring countries has been much 
below the potential. The potential sectors for economic cooperation between the two 
countries include agricultural products, especially tea, auto spare-parts, minerals, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, leather, textiles, telecommunications, iron ore, energy 
resources, electricity generation using coal and wind energy etc. Of all the above 
                                                        
25 Sameer Suryakant Patil, “Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue: An Update”, Institute of Peace 
and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Special Report, No. 53, June 2008. 
26 Ibid 
27 Javed Mahmood, Shafi Baloch, “UN keeps mum on Sir Creek dispute”, The Nation, 
September 7, 2009. 
28 Ranjit Singh Ghuman, Davinder Kumar Madaan, “Indo-Pakistan Trade Cooperation and 
SAARC”, Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 2, Number 1, 2006. 
29 R.S. Ghuman, Indo-Pakistan Trade Relations, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 
1986, p.81. 
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mentioned sectors, there is an immense scope for cooperation in energy sector and 
textiles, especially ready-made traditional garments.  
 
The Composite Dialogue has led to substantial improvements in bilateral trade 
relations. In this regard, the Commerce Secretaries of the two sides met on 11- 12 
August 2004 in Islamabad to discuss various proposals to expand their economic and 
commercial relationship. The India-Pakistan Joint Study Group (JSG), constituted to 
discuss trade and economic issues in a detailed manner, met on 22-23 February 
2005. The delegation was led by the commerce secretaries of both sides.   
 
The Fourth Round of India-Pakistan talks on Economic and Commercial 
Cooperation within the framework of the Composite Dialogue was held on 31 July - 
1 August 2007 in New Delhi. The Indian delegation was led by Commerce 
Secretary, Shri G.K. Pillai and the Pakistani delegation was led by Syed Asif Shah, 
Secretary of Ministry of Commerce30. The talks were held in a cordial and 
constructive atmosphere. 
 
The two sides agreed on the following: 
i. Both sides emphasized the importance of having bank branches in either 
country to facilitate trade. Both sides agreed to finalise the processing of 
the applications for the two bank branches in either country within six 
months of the receipt of applications or by 31st December 2007 whichever 
is later; 
ii. To facilitate import of cement from Pakistan, the Indian side informed that 
India will complete all statutory certification related formalities on a fast 
track. The Indian side informed that it is also in the process of making 
appropriate policy changes to accept third party certification;  
iii. To facilitate import of tea from India it was agreed to facilitate and 
encourage the trading of tea through rail. Pakistan side noted the request 
for providing duty concessions on import of Indian tea;  
iv. Pakistan will nominate representatives to the Joint Working Group to 
discuss the issues relating to joint registration of Basmati rice as 
Geographical Indication (GI) and the first meeting of the Group will be 
held at an early date. The Pakistan side raised the issue of Notification 
issued by India declaring ‘Super Basmati rice’ as an approved variety for 
export. India agreed to look into this issue;  
v. The Indian delegation handed over a list of 484 tariff lines for inclusion in 
the Positive List of items importable from India. The Pakistan side agreed 
to examine the request in consultation with stakeholders;   
vi. The Indian side informed that a Task Force comprising of representatives 
from various ministries and departments of Government of India has been 
constituted to address the issues of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) and para-
tariffs. The Task Force will make recommendations in a time bound 
manner for removing these barriers to provide greater market access to all 
members of SAARC;   
                                                        
30 Joint Statement on the Fourth Round of India Pakistan talks on Economic and Commercial 
Cooperation, New Delhi, August 1 2007, at http://indembkwt.org/press/aug0107.htm 
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vii. In order to address the issue of imbalance in bilateral trade, the Indian side 
invited the Pakistan side to identify twenty products of its export interest so 
that India could inform Pakistan about the detailed import regime on these 
products with a view to facilitating their import into India; 
viii. Both sides will facilitate holding of trade exhibitions in each other’s 
country. The Indian side invited Pakistan to organize a “Made in Pakistan” 
Trade Fair in India; 
ix. A delegation from Pakistan was invited to visit India to see some of the IT-
enabled tele-medicine facilities, with the objective of exploring avenues of 
cooperation in this field; 
x. The Indian side made a presentation on the state of development of 
Integrated Check-post (ICP) planned to be developed at Wagah/Attari 
Border at the Indian side. The Pakistan side also briefed on the state of 
infrastructure and proposed plan for development on its side. Both sides 
agreed to continue the exchange of information on the development of 
ICPs on either side; 
xi. Both sides noted with satisfaction the initiative to allow cross border 
movement of trucks, up to designated points at Wagah/Attari, for 
unloading/reloading of cargo. It was decided that the first technical level 
meeting to work out modalities would be held on 20th August 2007 at the 
Wagah border on the Pakistan side;  
xii. Indian side also proposed that in order to reduce pressure on Attari-Lahore 
Rail route and to improve trade, the Munabao-Khokrapar route should be 
opened for freight movement.  Pakistan side noted the proposal; 
xiii. Both sides agreed to constitute a Joint Group headed by Joint Secretaries of 
Commerce of both countries to monitor and coordinate the decisions taken 
during the Fourth Round of talks on economic and commercial cooperation 
within the framework of Composite Dialogue.31 
The official trade increased from a paltry US$ 300 million in 2003-04 to US $ 
2.1 billion in 2008-09. But after the November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks, the India-
Pakistan trade declined by approximately 60 % in 2009-10 with the overall trade 
falling from US$ 2.1 billion to US$ 900 million. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
31   Joint Statement on the Fourth Round of India-Pakistan talks on Economic and 
Commercial Cooperation, New Delhi; August 1, 2007, at  
http://indembkwt.org/press/aug0107.htm 
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Figure 1. Impact of Political Tensions on India-Pakistan Trade
32
 
Note: Trade is measured as a sum of exports and imports in nominal U.S. dollar values. 
 
There have been a number of studies using gravity models to assess the effects 
of SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area) on inter-regional trade. Based on these 
studies, India-Pakistan trade could increase up to 50 times its current level. A more 
recent study, using the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) gravity 
model, shows that the potential for formal trade between India and Pakistan is 
roughly 20 times greater than recorded trade. This means that at 2008 trade levels, 
total trade (exports and imports) between India and Pakistan could have expanded 
from its level of US$ 2.1 billion to as much as US$ 42 billion if the ‘normal’ 
relations estimated by the PIIE gravity model for trading partners were to hold for 
the two countries.33 
 
The Government of Pakistan is in the process of granting the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) status to India. This step would go a long way in building trust and 
confidence between the two countries. Perhaps the decision to grant MFN status 
signals a shift in Pakistani policy towards India, but to what extent it will have a 
bearing on political and diplomatic relations in the long term remains to be seen. 
 
Cross-LoC Trade 
 
Since the introduction of trade across the line of control (LoC) in Jammu and 
Kashmir in the year 2008, as a confidence building measure under the Indo-Pak 
composite dialogue, traders have established a regular exchange of goods. Critical to 
the establishment of trade was the decision of New Delhi and Islamabad not to 
impose trade tariffs on goods. After two years, the trade figures seem impressive. 
The average weekly import of goods from Pakistani to the Indian side of Kashmir 
                                                        
32 Source:  50 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, and Ministry of Commerce, Government of 
Pakistan. 
33 Mohsin S. Khan, “Improving India-Pakistan relations through trade”, East Asia Forum 
(Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific), April 19th, 2010. 
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during 2010 was eight crore Pakistani rupees. The fact that an overwhelming 
majority of traders come from divided families, whose engagement is sustained by 
familial ties, reflects that the trade is sustained as much by emotion as by economic 
rationale. 
 
However traders face considerable obstacles, primarily from the heavy 
constraints that govern their activities. There are basic issues related to economic 
facilities and infrastructure. “We are suffering losses in crores for want of adequate 
storage facility. We were forced to keep the goods in open during rainy conditions, 
which damaged truckloads of items,” said President, Salamabad-Chakoti Traders 
Association, Asif Lone.34 From a meagre two trucks a week, the quantum of the 
cross-LoC trade has jumped to 250 trucks. However traders said there is facility for 
storage only for 20-30 truckloads of goods at the Centre. They claim that neither 
there were sufficient godowns at TFC (Trade Facilitation Centre) nor have 
authorities hired skilled porters to load or unload the goods. The traders have been 
demanding for a long time that storage capacity should be increased. Minister for 
Industries, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, SS Salathia, acknowledged that lack 
of storage facilities is a problem at Salamabad Trade Centre (STC). “We have 
acquired land for setting up the facility and have kept Rs five crore for it,” he said. 
Regarding other facilities like Banking, the minister said they had taken up the issue 
with government of India on several occasions. “But nothing has happened.”35 
 
The lack of communication facilities is another impediment to normal trade. 
Because they have no direct connection with the traders on the other side, traders on 
the Indian side of J&K have to follow a circuitous route for communication. Citing 
security reasons, the Government of India has banned the international direct dialing 
system from within J&K to any part of Pakistan, including the Pakistan 
Administered Kashmir. It is also not possible for traders to visit their counterparts on 
the other side of the LoC. Theoretically, they can use the bus service, mainly meant 
for residents, to freely move to the other side but in practice the service has not been 
opened to the public and remains restricted to ‘divided families’. The most important 
constraint on the trade, however, is defined by the absence of a financial 
arrangement. No decision has been taken on the currency to be used for trade and no 
banking system has been provided. In a meeting with the representatives of 
Salamabad Chakoti Trade Union on May 10, 2011, the Minister for Finance, 
Government of Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir, Abdul Rahim Rather 
assured them that the Reserve Bank of India has framed a comprehensive scheme 
which is under consideration of the governments of India and Pakistan. “Once the 
scheme gets the nod, banking facilities would be put in place to conduct LoC trade 
as per the urges and aspirations of the traders.”36 But still no decision has been taken 
in this regard neither by the government of India or Pakistan. Hence, trade takes 
place through the most medieval barter system.  
 
As a result, both the business community and the civil society are upset with 
the pace of progress. Even those sections, which wholeheartedly supported this 
CBM, are today cynical on the success of this initiative, if the cross-LoC crawls at a 
snail’s pace. The business communities on both sides complain that it is not even a 
barter trade, but also a blind trade. “We don’t expect from the government to provide 
us the banking and proper communication facilities. It will be more than enough if 
they can set up temporary tin sheds for storing the goods. Let government come open 
                                                        
34 Muddasir Ali, “Official ‘apathy’ botch up cross-LoC trade”, Greater Kashmir, 04 January, 
2011. 
35 Greater Kashmir, 04 January, 2011. 
36 Greater Kashmir, 11 May, 2011. 
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with its plans on the cross-LoC trade. It is not only business but our emotions are 
attached with it. Kashmiris have given huge sacrifices to make it a reality,” said 
General Secretary, Salamabad-Chakoti Traders Association, Bilal Turkey. “We have 
been paying from our own pockets for any kind of repair work or other arrangements 
needed from time to time at the Trade Centre. How can government now turn their 
back on us,” said Turkey. The traders allege that certain quarters in the establishment 
are hell bent on sabotaging the cross-LoC trade as they do not want expansion of any 
economic activity between the two parts of Kashmir. More than 350 Valley based 
traders and another 10,000 people earn their livelihood directly or indirectly from the 
intra-Kashmir trade. 
 
If the cross-LoC trade has to flourish, the most important step is to find a 
banking mechanism to replace the existing barter system. In this regard the proposal 
put forward by the J&K Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry (J&K JCCI) and 
other civil society members for the opening of a branch of the J&K Bank in 
Muzaffarabad and a branch of the AJK Bank in Srinagar would be of great 
significance. Besides, no modern trade can work on barter system of 21 items 
undertaken by two parties who are not even in direct communication with each 
other. It is important to give traders an opportunity to cross the LoC to make market 
assessments that will allow them to go beyond the ‘blind trade’ system that they 
operate within. Without compromising security, New Delhi and Islamabad will need 
to make bold decisions to serve the larger objective of both states from the cross LoC 
interactions. 
 
TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 
 
One of the driving factors for India to agree to a composite dialogue was to 
address the issue of terrorism. The 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military stand-off took 
place against the backdrop of The War on Terror in the region. The attack on the 
Jammu and Kashmir state assembly in Srinagar on October 1, 2001 and subsequent 
attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 precipitated a 10-month 
military stand-off between the two countries. Pakistan for the first time condemned 
the attack on the state assembly and the Indian Parliament.37 The thaw in India-
Pakistan relations began in April 2003 and resulted in ceasefire on the LoC on 26 
November 2003.38  
 
The issue of terrorism is the most contentious one in Indo-Pak bilateral 
relations. Within the framework of Composite Dialogue process, the first round of 
secretary level talks representing the Indian Home Ministry and Pakistani Interior 
Ministry was held on 10 - 11 August 2004. The talks showed the willingness of the 
two sides to jointly address terrorism and drug trafficking and called for the signing 
of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to institutionalise their cooperation on 
these counts.39 The two delegations also expressed their satisfaction over the 
growing cooperation between Narcotics Control Authorities of the two sides through 
information sharing. The second round of secretary level talks were held on 29-30 
August 2005 discussing the progress made since the first round and steps which 
could be taken to eliminate terrorism. The home secretaries signed an agreement on 
30 August 2005 on the release of prisoners treating it as a humanitarian issue. It was 
agreed to keep each other notified about any arrests made, provide consular access 
within three months of the arrest and expedite release as soon as the term of 
                                                        
37 Shaheen Akhtar, “War on Terrorism and Kashmir issue”, Institute of Regional Studies 
(IRS), Islamabad, 2010. 
38 Ibid 
39 Ashutosh Misra, “An audit of the India-Pakistan peace process”, p. 515. 
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imprisonment was complete. In these talks the proposal for cooperation between the 
Indian Central Bureau of Investigations and Pakistani Federal Investigation Agency 
was considered as well.40 The third round of talks at the level of Interior/ Home 
Secretaries was held on 30-31 May 2006 which praised the progress made in talks 
between the Indian Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and the Pakistani Anti Narcotic 
Force (ANF). The meeting between ANF and NCB to jointly address the threat of 
drug trafficking across the International Border (IB) and LoC could be seen as 
significant and meaningful which shows that while the longstanding disputes still 
persist, the two sides can establish cooperation in addressing common challenges.41 
In this context, the fourth round of Home/Interior Secretary Level Talks between 
India and Pakistan on Terrorism and Drugs Trafficking, as a part of the continuing 
Composite Dialogue process between the two countries, was held in New Delhi on 
July 3, 2007. Both sides strongly condemned all acts of terrorism and underlined the 
imperative need for effective and sustained measures against terrorist activities. Both 
sides noted with satisfaction that the recently formed Committee on Prisoners, 
comprising eminent retired judges from the two countries, is a useful instrument to 
facilitate release and repatriation of prisoners who have served their prison 
sentences. Separate working groups discussed in detail the drafts of the revised Visa 
and Consular Access Agreements aimed at liberalizing and making existing 
provisions more effective. The text of the Agreement on Consular Access has been 
finalised. Also, they made considerable progress towards an early finalisation and 
signing of the Visa Agreement.  
 
JOINT ANTI-TERRORISM MECHANISM (HAVANA DECLARATION) 
 
Since the suspension of the peace process in July 2006, following the Mumbai blasts, 
the first formal talks came about in September in Havana, Cuba on the sidelines of 
the Non-Aligned Summit where Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh and General 
Pervez Musharraf agreed to revive the stalled process. At the same time India 
clarified that it was important for Pakistan to agree to a joint mechanism for 
addressing terrorism as a condition to move forwards in the peace process. Thus 
emerged the ‘Havana Declaration’ which set up a Joint Anti-terrorism Institutional 
Mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and 
investigations. The first meeting of JATM (March 2007) was held in the backdrop of 
tragic Samjhauta Express incident and defined the parameters of bilateral anti-terror 
cooperation.42 Second meeting of the JATM (October 22, 2007) led to the update on 
the information shared in the earlier meeting and resolved to cooperate with one 
another to identify measures, exchange specific information and assist in 
investigations. 
 
On the other hand, the fifth round of Interior/Home Secretary Level Talks 
between India and Pakistan on Terrorism and Drugs Trafficking was held in 
Islamabad on 25th and 26th November 2008 as a part of the Composite Dialogue. 
The Pakistan delegation was led by Syed Kamal Shah, Secretary, Ministry of 
Interior, while the Indian delegation was headed by Mr. Madhukar Gupta, Home 
Secretary of India. Both sides discussed the issues related to terrorism and drug 
trafficking and reviewed the implementation of decisions taken during the last round. 
                                                        
40 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2005, ‘Joint Press Statement at the End 
of Home Secretary Level Talks between India and Pakistan on Terrorism and Drug 
Trafficking’, New Delhi, 30 August <http://meaindia.nic.in> 
41 Joint Statement, Third Round of Pakistan-India Interior/Home Secretary Talks on 
Terrorism and Drugs Trafficking, Islamabad, 31 May 2006, at <http://meaindia.nic.in> 
42 Shabana Fayyaz, “Indo-Pak Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism: Perspectives from Pakistan”, 
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Issue Brief 126, September 2009. 
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They condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and affirmed their 
resolve to cooperate with each other to combat the menace of terrorism.43 The MoU 
on Drug Demand Reduction and Prevention of Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics 
Drugs/Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals and Related Matters, was 
initialised. However the November 26, 2008 attacks on several key places in 
Mumbai – the Taj and the Oberoi hotels, among other places have put a halt on the 
dialogue process. It seemed that a war could break out between these two nuclear 
weapons upstarts. Thanks to the restraint exercised by their governments as well as 
hectic diplomacy by the United States (US), the United Kingdom and other major 
players, a major disaster was averted.  
 
PROMOTION OF FRIENDLY EXCHANGES IN VARIOUS FIELDS  
 
Talks under the Friendly Exchanges include art and culture, education, 
Ayurvedic and Unani medicine, archaeology, tourism, youth affairs, sports and 
media. Over the years, exchanges such as cricket matches, visits by academicians, 
professionals, peace activists and journalists constructively contributed to building 
mutual understanding and friendship. Cricket has helped in bridging the divide, 
allowing the fans from both sides to travel to the other country to watch the match 
and enjoy mutual hospitality. Such exchanges have shaped peoples perceptions 
positively in both countries towards each other. In 1987 General Zia-ul Haq flew to 
Jaipur, in India, to witness a match. General Musharraf followed suit almost two 
decades later, coming to watch an India-Pakistan match in New Delhi during his 
state visit in April 2005.44 Similarly on March 30th 2011, Pakistan's prime minister, 
Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani and India's prime minister, Dr Manmohan Singh sat side 
by side to watch the India-Pakistan cricket semi-final at Mohali—an act of "cricket 
diplomacy."  
 
Since the resumption of the peace process in 2004, Secretary level talks 
representing the Indian Ministry of Tourism and Culture and Pakistani Ministry of 
Culture were held on the ‘‘Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields’’ in 
New Delhi, on 34 August 2004.45 The next round of meetings was held on 26-27 
July 2005 in Islamabad. On 1-2 June 2006, the third round of Secretary-level talks 
between India and Pakistan were held in New Delhi. Badal K. Das, Secretary, 
Department of Culture, Ministry of Tourism and Culture represented the Indian side 
and Jalil Abbas, Secretary, Ministry of Culture represented the Pakistani side. They 
reviewed the progress in the field of Friendly Exchanges and looked at issues such as 
raising the number of pilgrims who seek to visit religious shrines on both sides and 
easing visa regulations for delegations and individuals who want to visit their 
relatives on both sides. 
 
TRANSPORT LINKS 
 
In order to enhance cross-border movement of people to meet their long divided 
families and relatives, India and Pakistan agreed to start a number of bus services. 
                                                        
43 Joint Statement issued at the end of the Home/Interior Secretary level talks between India 
and Pakistan in Islamabad on 25-26 November 2008, Ministry of External Affairs, New 
Delhi, November 26, 2008. 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/ind_pak_jstmnt_26nov2008.
htm 
44 Ashutosh Misra, “An audit of the India-Pakistan peace process”, p. 521. 
45 Joint Press Statement on ‘India-Pakistan Discussion on Promotion of Friendly Exchanges 
in Various Fields’, New Delhi, 4 August 2004, at <http://meaindia.nic.in/declarestatement 
/2004/08/904js01.htm> 
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These included Srinagar-Muzaffarabad which started on 7 April 2005, Poonch-
Rawalakot on June 19 2005 and Amritsar-Nankana Sahib on January 20, 2006. It has 
also been agreed to start truck trade on the Srinagar- Muzaffarabad and Suchetgarh-
Sialkot. In addition, the Delhi-Lahore train service resumed on 11 July 2003 
(suspended in December 2001 following the terrorist attack on the Indian 
Parliament) and Kokhrapar-Munabao service on 18 February 2006 (defunct since the 
1965 war).  The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was a watershed in Indo-Pak 
relations. Initially, the talks were stalled over the modalities pertaining to travel 
documents with Pakistan insisting on United Nations documents and India on 
passports as travel documents. Pakistan also demanded the bus service be limited to 
Kashmiris, as opposed to India’s proposal to open it for all Indians. Eventually in 
February 2005 in Islamabad, the two Foreign Ministers Natwar Singh and 
Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri signed the agreement overcoming the differences on 
travel documents and domicile of the passengers. The bus service was inaugurated 
on 7 April 2005 but was opposed by political parties in Pakistan such the Pakistan 
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) who argued it would 
dilute the ‘core’ issue of Kashmir. 
 
On 2 June 2005 moderates belonging to the All Party Hurriyat Conference 
(APHC) in Jammu and Kashmir led by its Chairman Mirwaiz Umar Farooq boarded 
the bus to visit leaders in Pakistan Administered Kashmir and Islamabad. The visit 
drew flak from the United Jihad Council (UJC) leader Syed Salahuddin and 
hardliners in Srinagar, with an unfazed Mirwaiz criticizing the hardliners on both 
sides saying:  
  
“For fear of being labelled as treacherous should we sit at home and repeat 
the song of UN resolutions. One lakh people have already lost their lives. 
Should we wait for the sacrifices of another lakh people before we begin to 
look at the other possible ways to resolve the issue? There are people in 
Kashmir who considered talking to New Delhi as treachery. Now we are being 
told that even visiting Pakistan amounted to treachery. It is high-time the word 
treachery is re-defined […]when we return to Kashmir, we need to redefine 
certain things […] certain words and phrases.”46 
 
CHALLENGES AHEAD 
 
The fact remains that India-Pakistan relationship has been and rather remains 
complex and variable. There are limited people-to-people contacts that may 
contribute to overcoming the negative perceptions that many Indians and Pakistanis 
have for each other. Most contacts other than family reunion are restricted to 
members of a small, middle-to-upper class elite prepared to endure the demanding 
visa and entry regimes. Indians and Pakistanis also have limited and difficult ways of 
accessing one another, with few flights each week between the two nations and even 
fewer border crossing points along their long border. There is one road crossing 
(Wagah-Attari) and two rail crossings (Wagah-Attari and Munabao-Khokrapar). 
Nevertheless, the Composite Dialogue shows that India-Pakistan relations are 
advancing slowly, although it seems unlikely that there will be any ground breaking 
agreements in the short- to medium-term. 
Furthermore, India and Pakistan seem to have different approaches to the 
Composite Dialogue. For Pakistan, its desire appears to be to get India to agree as 
soon as possible to resolve some of the serious issues that have bedevilled the India-
Pakistan relationship. It reflects Islamabad’s desire and need to achieve something 
concrete, given the significant compromise that Pakistan made by renouncing its 
                                                        
46 Ashutosh Misra, “An audit of the India-Pakistan peace process”, p. 521. 
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long-held stance to resolve the ‘unfinished business of partition’, the Kashmir 
dispute, as a prerequisite to entering into a more involved and complex relationship 
with India. For India, the idea seems to be to ‘hasten slowly’ and build up strong 
economic links. This, arguably, has always been India’s stance, although New Delhi 
also has compromised by agreeing to actually discuss the Kashmir dispute in a 
meaningful way as part of the India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue. 
 
The biggest problem between India and Pakistan currently is the absence of 
trust. Anything that addresses this trust deficit is, therefore, helpful in the way 
forward. In this regard let me recall what former Indian Prime Minister Mr. 
Vajpayee had said during a debate in the Lok Sabha: that “you can change history 
but not geography.” Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh echoed similar sentiments 
in a debate in the Lok Sabha, where he said: “As neighbours it is our obligation to 
keep our channels open. Unless we want to go to war with Pakistan, dialogue is the 
only way forward.”47 In this situation of distrust, the political leadership in the two 
countries should show political will to resolve the outstanding issues.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Indo-Pak composite dialogue is a desirable approach but is prone to derailment 
if attempts are made to find instant solutions to old and complex problems. There is 
no alternative to an incremental peace process through political, economic and 
military confidence building measures. Dramatic gestures or a few summit meetings 
between top leaders cannot bring peace, which is only possible incrementally. The 
main achievements of the composite dialogue process have been in the area of 
CBMs designed to enhance India-Pakistan contacts and connectivity. It needs 
recognition that the dialogue process has not succeeded in resolving any of the major 
issues in disputes like Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Tulbul Project or Sir Creek. 
Progress on these essential issues has been thwarted by the unreasonable positions 
and mutual distrust of one another. The success of the composite dialogue process 
depends entirely on the importance both states give to it. Regardless of how 
contentious the issues may be, so long as the participants are determined to remain 
engaged and work sincerely together, the process will bear fruit.  
 
There are compelling reasons why India should pro-actively engage with 
Pakistan. First, a tension-free relationship with Pakistan would help India to 
consolidate its nationhood, the bonding adhesive of which is secularism. Second, the 
issue of terrorism can be effectively tackled only in cooperation with Pakistan and 
not in confrontation with it. Third, India will not be able to play its due role in 
international affairs so long as it is dragged down by its quarrels with Pakistan. 
 
Equally is it in Pakistan’s interest to seek accommodation with India for three 
counterpart reasons. First, the Indian bogey has harmed rather than helped 
consolidate the nationhood of Pakistan. Second, Pakistan is unable to become a full-
fledged democracy and a sustained fast-growing economy owing to the 
disproportionate role assigned to alleged Indian hostility in the national affairs of the 
country. And, third, on the international stage, Pakistan is one of the biggest 
countries in the world and instead of being the front-line in someone else’s war 
perhaps deserves to come into its own as the front-line state in the pursuit of its own 
interests. 
 
                                                        
47 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, “Kashmir solution-an imperative for peace”, Times of India, 
May 03, 2010. 
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